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The sustained trajectory of annual federal deficits risks tangible, negative consequences 
for lawmakers and taxpayers alike.  Projected to reach $900 billion in FY19, the 
budgetary deficit will hit $1 trillion by 2022, and amount to $11.6 trillion over the next 
decade.   By 2023, interest payments on the debt will eclipse the entire yearly 
appropriation for the Department of Defense.  Through their treatment of pay-as-you-go 
rules, the budget reconciliation provisions, emergency spending authorizations, and the 
disregard for discretionary spending caps, Congress has proved to be a guilty partner in 
aiding and abetting America’s untenable fiscal outlook.   Since the enactment of the 
watershed Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974, executive and legislative 
branch actors alike have repeatedly proposed a biennial system of federal budgeting with 
split years of authorization and appropriation aimed at curtailing abused processes and 
functioning as a framework through which deficits can be diminished.   This paper seeks 
to trace the legislative and structural history of deficit controls since 1974 before 
ultimately analyzing the benefits and detriments biennial budgeting would present to the 
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Action-Forcing Event 
 In November of 2018, the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations 
(JSCBAPR) dissolved1 without achieving its established goal of advancing 
recommendations and proposed legislative language to “significantly reform the budget 
and appropriations process.”2  Less than two months after the dissolution of this body, the 
government suffered the longest shutdown in U.S. history, as the lack of spending 
authority for seven appropriation bills stretched on for thirty-five days, directly affecting 
800,000 federal workers and resulting in a $3 billion permanent reduction in real GDP 
and a $2 billion loss of tax revenue.3  Without substantial and meaningful reform of 
budgeting rules and regulations, repeated disruptions in federal operations will continue 
to occur, thereby eroding public confidence in the government’s ability to conduct its 





                                                 
1 Erica Werner, "Congress's Special Committee to Fix the Broken Budget Process has Broken Down," 
Washington Post.com. Nov 30, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/congresss-
special-committee-to-fix-the-broken-budget-process-has-broken-down/2018/11/29/51768f50-f424-11e8-
aeea-b85fd44449f5_story.html.  
2 Committee on the Budget House of Representatives, Legislative History of the Joint Select Committee on 
Budget and Appropriations Reform (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, [2018]).  
3 Jennifer Scholtes and Caitlin Emma, "Shutdown Cost the U.S. $3 Billion that Won'T be Recovered, CBO 






Statement of Problem 
Any elementary analysis of America’s current fiscal state reveals ominous signs 
of danger, from rising deficits and increasing interest costs to the dysfunction of the 
federal budget process, the annual mechanism designed to establish spending priorities 
and appropriate funds from the treasury.  In the following pages, it will be my aim to 
assess the critical budgetary challenges, both substantive and procedural in nature, facing 
today’s government leaders, and to ultimately illustrate how these issues threaten 
America’s long-term fiscal governance.    
In the post-9/11 era, the level of national debt has garnered considerable attention 
from interest groups, governmental actors, and citizens alike.  In particular, analysts have 
highlighted the shift from budget surpluses in the waning years of the Clinton 
administration, to significant hikes in budget deficits during the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  Whereas the federal debt totaled $5.67 trillion at the close of FY 2001, it 
had swelled to over $21.52 trillion by the beginning of FY 2019.4  Federal receipts 
exceeded outlays in only one year during this period (FY 2001), and deficits averaged       
-4.1% of gross domestic product, peaking at -9.77% during the midst of the Great 
Recession.5  Federal deficits are most often categorized into cyclical and structural 
balances.  Cyclical debt is the result of economic performance, where receipts are lower 
and unemployment spending increases in a contracting economy.  Alternatively, 
structural debts are unrelated to economic performance, and will not be recovered in 
                                                 
4 "Historical Debt 
Outstanding."https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm (accessed 
February 7, 2018).  
5 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Federal Surplus Or Deficit [-] as Percent of Gross Domestic 





periods of GDP growth.  These deficits are most likely the result of long-term trends and 
current laws, such as an aging population with consistent occurrences of corporate and 
personal tax avoidance.6  
Furthermore, according to the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
10-year forecast published in January, annual deficits are projected to continue to rise 
(Figure 1).   After totaling almost $900 billion in FY19, the annual budgetary deficit will 
hit $1 trillion by 2022, and amount to $11.6 trillion over the next decade.   Interest costs 
on this debt will reach $383 billion this fiscal year, and will represent the third largest 
“program,” as defined by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), within the 
federal budget by FY2025.7  Additionally, during the same 10-year period, the deficit is 
estimated to average 4.4% of GDP, a significant increase over the past 50 years, when 
deficits averaged 2.9% of GDP.8  The cumulative national debt held by the public at this 
point will constitute 93% of GDP, more than double the 50-year running average.9  In 
summation, the structural disparities between federal receipts and outlays will only 
worsen in the next decade, as mandatory spending for healthcare costs and an aging 
population accelerate debt levels overtake economic production.   
Such an alarming fiscal trajectory will result in tangible, negative outcomes for 
lawmakers and taxpayers alike.  First, as interest rates continue a slow increase toward 
levels before the Great Recession, federal budgeting will necessitate larger interest 
                                                 
6 Patrick Kelly and Cassandra Rohland, "The United States Federal Budget Project," Journal of Accounting 
Education 41 (2017), 48. doi:10.1016/j.jaccedu.2017.09.002. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=126165117&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
7 .The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019-2029(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, [2019]).  
8 Ibid., “Visual Summary.” 





payments, reducing national savings and capital at a faster rate.10  According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, “interest payments will overtake Medicaid in 2020 and the 
Department of Defense budget in 2023.”11  Second, policymakers will have less 
flexibility to direct spending policies toward emergencies or unexcepted priorities, such 
as disaster relief or military expenditures.  Lastly, the likelihood of a fiscal crisis will 
only increase, as the government will be more beholden to investors’ demands to finance 
continued borrowing with significantly higher interest returns.  If this occurs, we risk 
devaluing the dollar as the world’s premiere currency, losing such benefits as cheaper 
imports and travel abroad.  Interest rates would rise abruptly and sharply, negating 











Figure 1.  Projected Annual Deficits  
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:2019 to 2029 
                                                 
10 Ibid., pg. 15.  The CBO also stated, “Productivity and total wages would be lower than would be the case 
if the debt was smaller.” 
11 Nelson D. Schwartz, "As Debt Rises, the Government Will Soon Spend More on Interest than on the 





  The procedural budgetary elements are equally grim and untenable.   FY2019 
marks the 45th anniversary of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act, the law which established the modern federal budget process and reset the fiscal year 
to run from October through September.   However, instead of adhering to these 
budgetary deadlines, Congress has repeatedly dismissed them, choosing to utilize budget 
proposals as a vehicle for political bickering and a host for partisan disagreements.  This 
dysfunction has led to 1996 being the last year that Congress has passed all of the 
necessary appropriation bills before October 1st.  In addition, Congress has only 
completed budget resolutions, a concurrent blueprint designed to establish targets for 
budget authority and outlays, in ten of the past twenty years.12   These repeated budget 
impasses have led to three government shutdowns in the past 14 months, including the 
longest in federal history, which stretched for thirty-five days (December 22 – January 
25, 2019) and affected 800,000 federal workers across nine federal departments and 
numerous independent agencies.13    
 The underlying structural assumptions behind the CBO’s daunting budget 
projections are grounded in two programmatic areas, social security and health care-
related expenses.  Whereas the twelve budgetary appropriation bills, otherwise referred to 
as “discretionary spending,” account for roughly 30% of all spending in each year, 
                                                 
12 Molly E. Reynolds, "What's Wrong with the Congressional Budget Process?" 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/11/03/whats-wrong-with-the-congressional-budget-
process/  
13 Jennifer Scholtes and Caitlin Emma, "Shutdown Cost the U.S. $3 Billion that Won'T be Recovered, CBO 






“mandatory spending” is projected to constitute 63%14 of all federal spending in FY19.15  
Social security alone is the largest, single federal budget item, with the FY19 budget 
estimating that it will cost $1.05 trillion, almost 40% of all mandatory spending.16  
Additionally, costs for social security and related health-care programs such as Medicare 
and Medicaid are only expected to grow, accounting for nearly 60% of total federal 
spending and 12.8% GDP by 2029.17  These costs, as a result of aging Baby boomers 
drawing down on benefits and technological breakthroughs allowing for sophisticated 
treatment of diseases, are simply rising faster than GDP and tax revenue.18   With the 
population declining after Baby boomers and generation X-ers, the growth of labor 
slowed, setting social security and Medicaid on tracks for insolvency.  Attempting to 
reform these programmatic areas is usually regarded as political suicide, since it 
guarantees electorate opposition by forcing groups to accept fewer benefits.   
  Perhaps of most import, the risks and sources of ballooning deficits also manifest 
themselves structurally in particular budgetary processes.  Specifically, Congress’ 
treatment of pay-as-you-go rules, the budget reconciliation system, emergency spending 
authorizations, and the disregard for discretionary spending caps are all items which I 
intend to examine in detail.  Each of these budgetary features were designed in part to 
provide governmental actors some amount of flexibility, albeit without jeopardizing 
fiscal integrity.  However, in the time since the institution of the Congressional Budget 
                                                 
14 Drew Desilver, "Congress has Long Struggled to Pass Spending Bills on Time," 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/16/congress-has-long-struggled-to-pass-spending-bills-on-
time/ 
15 The other 7% or so of spending represents interest payments on federal debt 
16 Desilver, “Congress has long struggled.”  
17 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019-2029. January 28, 2019. 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54918 
18 Ibid. Between the 50-year period from 1962 to 2012, tax revenue varied between 17% and 19% of GDP 





Act, each process has suffered abuse at the hands of its legislative makers, resulting in a 
continued trek toward fiscal insolvency, larger interest payments, and the dissolution of 
rules designed to keep outlays in pace with revenue.    
 In summation, the problems currently plaguing the federal budget are both 
substantive and structural in nature.   Even under current conditions, trillion-dollar 
deficits will become common place, and interest payments on the debt will not only 
represent a larger share of total economic output, but also risk crisis and downgraded 
credit ratings.  In addition, the budgetary process as outlined in the 1974 law has become 
largely nonexistent, as lawmakers instead commonly choose to weaponize the process as 
a forum for political haranguing and accept government shutdowns as a result.   As 
illustration of this, the statutory functions in place to limit deficits such as PAYGO and 
spending caps are consistently skirted through reconciliation, emergency authorizations, 
gimmick provisions, and amendments that terminate near-term savings.  If lawmakers 
continue to ignore budget procedures and accept their tax and spending priorities without 
offsets on such items as mandatory spending, the U.S. will only further itself down an 
unsustainable fiscal and budgetary path that holds deleterious consequences for both 












1974 Budget Control Act 
 The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) stands as a 
watershed development in the history of the federal budget process and in appropriation 
law.  The general procedures Congress utilizes today to exercise its power of the purse 
largely rely on the institutional framework and offices which emerged from CBA’s 
reforms.  The CBA evolved from President Nixon’s refusal to obligate nearly $12 billion 
dollars of congressionally-appropriated funds from 1972-1973.  The Nixon 
administration argued that although the Constitution bars an Executive from spending 
funds absent a Congressional appropriation, Congress lacked formal, systematic 
processes for assessing total spending compared to total revenue.19  Without such the 
procedures, the President needed the power to “impound” funds for lower priority items 
to prevent inordinate spending and deficit hikes.  Congress found this argument 
substantive and understood that they could not check the President’s impoundment 
abilities without a solidified appropriation process that made clear the explicit mandate 
for the executive branch to obligate and expend funds, regardless of perspective or 
utility.20  Outside of impoundment-related issues, the CBA’s specific institutional 
reforms to fortify Congress’ budget development have had lasting significance.  The 
three most important of these changes were: the formation of House and Senate Budget 
Committees, the establishment of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the 
reorganization of the fiscal year to run from October 1st through September 30th.  The 
                                                 
19 "Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: What is the History of the Federal Budget 
Process?"https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/bb_full_2018_1.pdf (accessed 
March 1, 2019).  





respective committees were charged with the central task of passing a concurrent budget 
resolution, an annual consideration which does not hold the power of law and thus is not 
subject to Senate filibuster, but instead sets targets for aggregate authority and outlays per 
discretionary functions such as education, defense, and transportation.  This resolution 
serves individual committees with effective spending ceilings21 as they deliberate over 
appropriations and tax measures and is to be passed by both houses of Congress no later 
than April 15th.   This type of budget blueprint also acts as a policy response to the 
President’s budget submitted in the beginning of February.  To aid Congress in their 
formation of the resolution, the CBA created the CBO, an independent, non-partisan 
office under the auspices of the legislative branch which would provide analysis of 
economic data, proposed legislation, and annual five-year projections of expenditures, 
revenues, and deficit figures.  The CBO would work under the assumption that absent 
explicit, legislative changes, existing levels of government spending would continue.  
The CBO would ideally be detached from party influences and able to provide forecasts 
and cost estimates that form the basis for the annual resolution.   
 For mandatory spending and entitlement programs, the CBA provided a different 
method for budgetary allocations.  The committees whose jurisdiction oversees such 
entitlement programs as Medicare and Social Security are granted allocations relative to a 
baseline figure of probable costs.  The CBO scores these baselines from a series of 
complicated analyses involving statutory language, historical trends, demographic shifts, 
and other circumstances.  These baseline figures, along with revenue estimates from the 
                                                 






Joint Committee on Taxation, are critical to the budget resolution.22  If the authorizing 
committees involved with mandatory spending have allocations from the budget 
committees equal to the baseline, as is frequently the case, they can comply with the 
budget by taking no action.   While the budget resolution can establish hard caps on 
appropriated accounts for the Department of Education or the National Institutes of 
Health, an enforceable budget for entitlement spending is comparatively more fleeting 
since its grounded in estimates and projections.  If increased spending is required due to 
greater enrollment or higher average cost of benefit per enrollee, no mechanisms exist to 
compel remedial action.  Instead, the funds will simply be outlaid from the main treasury 
accounts and the government will borrow to cover the difference.  In effect, the budget 
process and the budget resolution encourage mandatory spending to rise organically as 
more benefits are required by more people, without any action from congressional actors.   
 The CBA of 1974 also introduced a new legislative process called reconciliation, 
a forceful mechanism that allows for expedited consideration on certain legislation 
involving debt limit hikes, spending, and revenues.23  While a whole host of detailed 
procedural rules governs the particulars of the process in each chamber, the basic 
structure of reconciliation requires an agreed upon budget resolution that includes 
accompanying ‘reconciliation instructions’ to individual committees.  These committees 
are directed to mark up additional authorizing legislation that harmonizes the programs 
under their preview with the allocations afforded to them under the resolution.  For the 
period of time the legislation covers, typically one fiscal year, the committees can reach 
                                                 
22 James C. Capretta, "Reforming the Budget Process," National Affairs 21 (2014), 64-80. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=98535616&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  






these targets by either increasing or decreasing spending, revenue, or raising the debt 
ceiling.  If multiple committees receive reconciliation instructions, the Budget 
Committees gather the new legislation into omnibus bills for the entire chamber.  In the 
Senate, the reconciliation bills can be adopted with only a simple majority, and debate is 
limited to 20 hours.   Any offered amendments are subject to the Byrd Rule, which bans 
provisions which are tangential or unrelated to the fundamental budgetary issues and 
programs at hand.24  Since the enactment of the CBA, reconciliation has been critical to 
the passage of welfare reform in 1996, tax cuts in 2003 and 2017, and healthcare reform 
under the Affordable Care Act in 2010.25    
 The CBA’s legacy is largely marked by mixed results and varying degrees of 
effectiveness.  On one hand, the reforms enacted in 1974 provided Congress with the 
necessary legislative armament to carry out its appropriative responsibilities and backed 
the new procedures with nonpartisan information and analysis.  The budget resolution, as 
designed in theory, would impose new controls on entitlement legislation and borrowing 
authority.  The move of the fiscal year from July to October gives newly elected members 
of Congress additional time to participate in the budget process.   However, the 45 years 
of actualized implementation reveals consistent failure to enforce budget deadlines, a 
growing complexity in budget presentations, and an unwillingness to confront the 
ballooning costs of entitlements.   From 1974 to 2014, Congress passed budget 
resolutions by the mid-April deadline only six times, last occurring in 2003.26   As I 
pointed to earlier, ten of the past twenty years have contained no budget resolution at 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 "Q&A: Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974."https://www.pgpf.org/analysis/q-
and-a-congressional-budget-and-impoundment-control-act-of-1974 (accessed February 25, 2019).  





all.27   In terms of deficit control, 1950-1974 saw federal deficits averaging 0.7% of GDP.  
Conversely, from the adoption of the CBA in 1975 to the beginning of the Great 
Recession in 2007, deficits averaged around 2.5% of GDP.  On a micro level, inflation-
adjusted U.S. federal debt totaled $3,240 per person in 1974.  As of 2014, that same 
adjusted measure had risen to $16,527.28  Procedurally, the CBA’s initial conception of 
reconciliation has been warped into oft-abused means of partisan governance.  Originally 
designed as a means to adjust spending and tax bills already adopted within a given year 
and within a politically divided Congress, reconciliation has become a routine fast-track 
for sweeping legislative, particularly with bills aimed at lowering revenues and reducing 
taxes.  This method has been especially attractive when one party is in majority control of 
both chambers and the White House, allowing them to skirt the three-fifths requirement 
in the Senate.  This has led to a sort of budgetary vicious cycle where gridlock supports 
the viability of reconciliation as a legislative option, enacted reconciliation in turn 
impairs the trust necessary toward bipartisan governance, and the lack of bipartisan 
legislation engenders more stoppage and continues the cycle.   
1983 Social Security Amendments 
 One of the more consequential attempts to reform the swelling costs of mandatory 
spending came outside of the machinations of the regular budget process.  In 1983, nearly 
fifty years after the adoption of the Social Security Act by President Roosevelt, Congress 
reached an agreement with the Reagan administration to enact a series of legislature 
measures to alleviate the inherent fiscal imbalance within the program.  The urgent need 
for reform was evident, as the Social Security’s Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
                                                 
27 Reynolds, “What's wrong with the congressional budget process?” 





had been depleted to less than one-third of its peak value, and without legislative action, 
it would not have been possible to continue paying cash benefits on time beginning in 
July of 1983.29   The agreed upon $168 billion package of reforms represented a sort of 
‘Holy Grail’ of legislating, as it was the last time both parties consented to a mix of 
benefit cuts and tax increases with respect to Social Security.30   Among other conditions, 
the Amendments raised the age at which beneficiaries could obtain full benefits without 
penalties, authorized increases in payroll taxes, and instituted additional taxes of benefits 
for higher-income beneficiaries.   However, the two-year bump in the full retirement age 
from 65 to 67 was deferred to start in 2000 and phased in gradually after that, with the 
full implementation not occurring until 2027, more than 40 years after the Amendments 
were passed.31   At the time of the reforms, the trustee board projected that the fund 
wouldn’t be insolvent until the 2050s, but they have since revised their estimate to an 
expected exhaust date of 2033.32  The normal budget process as organized under the 
CBA was of no significance to these reforms, even though the long-term benefits are 
noteworthy.   
1985 Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act 
 The 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, better known as 
“Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,” (GRH) sought to introduce statutory deficit limits and 
statutory procedures to enforce the proposed caps.  In return for raising the debt ceiling 
over $2 billion, the GRH provided for annual reductions in the total budget deficit from 
                                                 
29 John A. Svahn and Mary Ross, "Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary 
of Provisions," Social Security Bulletin 46, no. 7 (July 1983), 3-48. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6356414.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Capretta, “Reforming the budget process.” 






$172 billion in FY 1986 to zero in FY 1991.33   The law did not stipulate what policies 
and programs should be modified to achieve this gradual elimination, leaving it to 
Congressional and Presidential purview to negotiate specifics.  If decreasing deficit 
targets were not met in a given year, per the reporting of the Comptroller General, the act 
required the President to invoke a “process for the cancelation of spending by executive 
order,”34 otherwise known as sequester.   The mandatory cuts would be split evenly 
between domestic discretionary spending and the defense budget.  Social Security, 
Medicare, interest on the debt, and several health-related programs were exempt from any 
potential sequester.  Procedurally, the GRH revisited two aspects of the budget resolution 
as outlined in the CBA.  First, although a budget resolution in a given year can function 
as an effective cap on allocations for new spending, the GRH deficit limits applied to 
already enacted spending and tax laws.  Second, certain simple-majority points of order 
on the House and Senate floor to protect the levels in the budget resolution were replaced 
with three-fifths threshold and the sequestration order at the instruction of the 
Comptroller General.   
 Ultimately, the sequestration process as outlined in the GRH was invalidated as 
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar, 1986.35  The ruling 
proffered that the Comptroller General, an officer of the legislative branch, could not 
compel executive action without violating separation of powers.   
 
                                                 
33 . Explanation of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, [1985]).  
34 Megan Suzanne Lynch, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect between 1985 and 2002Federation of 
American Scientists, [2011]).  





 1990 Budget Enforcement Act 
 Congress attempted to address the constitutionality of GRH with the 1987 
Reaffirmation Act (GRH-II), which extended the deficit limits through FY 1993 and 
shifted sequestration responsibilities to the Executive Branch within the Office of 
Management and Budget.  However, by 1990, it was evident that issues with the deficit 
targets still endured, and without action the total federal deficit would exceed GRH’s 
limits by nearly $100 billion.36  OMB estimated that a sequester of $85 billion would be 
required to alleviate the shortfall, including a 30% reduction to both defense and non-
defense discretionary programs.   This bleak outlook spurred Congressional negotiators to 
reach an agreement with the H.W. Bush administration on the Budget Enforcement Act 
of 1990 (BEA).37  The BEA fundamentally revised the processes as enacted in GHR and 
GHR-II, opting to preserve the deficit reduction realized in the accompanying 1990 
reconciliation bill through controls on new legislation, instead of enforcement based on 
the effects of previously enacted spending and tax laws.  Overall, the BEA established 
three mechanisms to achieve its ends: caps on discretionary spending in annual 
appropriations, adjustable deficit targets which accounted for revised economic data, and 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules which ordered that any new direct spending or decreased 
revenues be offset by other legislation that rendered the exchange deficit-neutral or 
deficit-reducing.  PAYGO was monitored on an annual basis via a scorecard and included 
carry over amounts into subsequent sessions if any budgetary effects were realized too 
late. Violations of either the discretionary spending caps or the PAYGO requirements 
                                                 
36 Lynch, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect between 1985 and 2002Federation of American Scientists, 
[2011]).  






were to result in sequestration at the directive of OMB.  Overall, budget analysts 
generally regard the BEA and its accompanying PAYGO statutes as having worked 
extremely well through the late 1990s, playing a key role in achieving the budget 
surpluses that existed from FY1998 – FY2001.  Preceding these surpluses, the deficit 
shrank from -4.7% of GDP in 1992 to a near balance in 1997.  Economist Robert 
Reischauer, the director of the CBO in 1990, later deemed the BEA “the foundation upon 
which the surpluses of the 1998 to 2001 period were built.”38  
1997 Balanced Budget Act  
 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 marked the end of tight controls on spending 
caps and the expiration of statutory PAYGO rules for over a decade.   GDP had grown at 
an average of 3.73% between 1994 and 1997,39 and there was little patience to revisit the 
intense partisan battles that oversaw government shutdowns in 1995 and 1996.  Thriving 
technology sectors and increases in the highest marginal tax rates spurred government 
receipts,40 and both parties were eager to claim the accomplishments of the looming 
budget surpluses.  The 1997 Act did preserve the BEA’s discretionary spending limits 
and PAYGO requirements until 2002, but those thresholds were breached, as the budget 
recorded its first official surplus in over 25 years.41  The surplus effectively achieved the 
objectives of the GRH and BEA, to combat and curb deficits.  In this new fiscal 
environment, with CBO projections highlighting additional surpluses in subsequent 
                                                 
38 Bruce Bartlett, "A Budget Deal that did Reduce the Deficit," 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2010/06/25/A-Budget-Deal-That-Did-Reduce-the-Deficit (accessed 
February 24, 2019).  
39 Kimberly Amadeo, "US GDP by Year Compared to Recessions and Events," 
https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543  
40 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Federal Surplus Or Deficit [-] as Percent of Gross Domestic 
Product," https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S  






outyears, previous legislative actions could not repress the urges to spend more.  To 
ostensibly adhere to the budget caps within the 1997 Act, lawmakers utilized a number of 
legislative gimmicks and procedural mechanisms to avoid enforcement.  These included 
delays in obligations and outlays, advancing appropriations into future years, emergency 
classifications, and particular policy directives.  For example, between 1999 and 2000, 
appropriators enacted $39 billion in emergency funding per year, compared to the $7.25 















Figure 2.  Emergency Budget Authority after the BEA 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2004 to 2013 
 The emergency funds obligated between those two years essentially equaled to 
the amounts designated as emergency in 2001 and 2002, as the nation responded to the 
attacks on 9/11.  In comparison to total discretionary spending having decreased at an 
average annual rate of 1.1% from 1991 through 1997, lawmakers statutorily broke the 
caps on budget authority, and the same appropriations rose at an average annual rate of 
8.5% from 1998-2002.  Since they were technically complying with PAGYO conditions, 





PAYGO procedures to expire, and the deficit returned at a rate of -1.4% of GDP the same 
year.42 
2011 Budget Control Act 
 The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA of 2011) developed as a response to 
warnings from the U.S. Treasury that the federal government would exceed its legal 
borrowing limit by August of 2011, risking a spike in interest rates, a decline in the value 
of the dollar, and volatile investment markets across the global economy.  The 
negotiations between a divided Congress and President Obama sought to strike an accord 
that would raise the debt ceiling to levels which would avoid an impasse in the immediate 
future, while also introducing budgetary enforcement mechanisms to address deficits 
which averaged -9.0% of GDP from 2009 through 2011.43  These deficits represented the 
highest levels since WWII and were largely born out of the diminished revenues and 
heighted spending demands from the Great Recession and accompanying 2009 stimulus 
package.  Overall, the Budget Control Act had four essential aspects.  First, the BCA 
called for a series of increases in the debt limit totaling at least $2 trillion.44  Congress 
could reject the increases throughout the process with veto-proof majorities in both 
chambers.  Second, the BCA established broad caps on discretionary spending through 
the annual appropriations process from FY2012 to FY2021.  Such discretionary spending 
caps were not unique, since they were integral to the reforms under the BEA in 1990 and 
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are generally followed by appropriators in years in which a budget resolution is passed.45  
However, the BCA specifically excluded several programs from being considered and 
allowed for upward adjustments to accommodate, among other items, any funds 
designated for military operations against terrorism (oversea contingency operations) or 
marked for disaster relief.   The CBO originally estimated that those spending caps would 
have generated $917 billion in savings over 10 years.46  Third, the BCA appointed a Joint 
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, a bipartisan body of legislators charged with 
developing legislation that would reduce the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion over the 
subsequent 10-year period.  Lastly, in the event that the Committee could not reach an 
agreement on a long-term plan, the BPA installed an enforcement mechanism in the form 
of annual reductions in the discretionary spending caps in tandem with across-the-board 
sequestration of non-exempt mandatory expenditures.   
 The specific processes governing the cap reductions and cancellation of funds 
(sequester) were technical and detailed, but their inclusion in the BPA was intended to 
coax agreement on a proposal for deficit reduction that was grounded in explicit budget 
priorities.  To lawmakers at the time, this type of arrangement was preferable to the 
automatic, across-the-board reductions in budget authority, especially since the cuts 
would be split equally between defense and non-defense functions.  However, when the 
Joint Committee announced in November of 2011 that it would not be possible to reach a 
bipartisan compromise, the enforcement mechanisms were spurred into action.  In total, 
the sequestration was projected to achieve the $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction from 
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FY2013 through FY2021, with $984 billion being harvested from programmatic cuts and 
$216 billion in savings from reduced interest payments on the debt.47  In FY2013, the 
sequester, by order of OMB, substantiated almost $43 billion48 in cuts for both defense 
and non-defense programs, which amounted to around an automatic 8% reduction of each 
program area.  The non-defense cuts were derived from mandatory and discretionary 
sources, including a 2% limit in cuts on Medicare payments.49  Social Security, 
Medicaid, and Overseas Contingency Operations were exempt from the sequester, as 
were certain anti-poverty programs such as SNAP, TANF, and housing vouchers.50  
Because of these exemptions, the cuts to Medicare payments through 2021 (ranging from 
$11-15 billion per year) were projected to comprise about two-thirds of all eligible 
mandatory cuts from the sequester in terms of dollars.    
 The inclusion of annual reductions in discretionary spending caps highlights an 
important distinction in how the CBA sought to achieve its targeted savings in out years.  
Unlike in 2013, when OMB ordered an explicit sequestration of funds already 
appropriated, the law called for a downward adjustment of discretionary spending caps 
starting in FY2014 to levels that would reap the intended $110 billion in savings per year.  
In practice, this would eliminate the need for the kind of automatic, proportional cuts that 
occurred in FY2013, a result which effectively stripped Congress’ flexibility to allocate 
the savings as it so desired.  Instead, the discretionary caps themselves were to be 
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reduced beforehand, and the President and the Congress would decide through the regular 
appropriation process how to advance an overall budget that fit within the caps.  The only 
statuary requirement was that the necessary reduction of $110 billion be split evenly 
between security and non-security accounts, but because the 2% cut in Medicare 
payments remained on the books and continued to grow,51 non-defense discretionary 
spending was projected to absorb less and less of the cut.  If Congress appropriated funds 
above the discretionary defense or non-defense cap levels, a sequestration order would be 
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Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2013, 2015 and 2018 
 Overall, the Budget Control Act represented a critical first step to setting the 
country on a more responsible fiscal path.  Indeed, in the three years after the bill’s 
enactment, deficits averaged -3% of GDP, compared to the -9% rate of the period 
between 2009-2011.52  In FY2015, the deficit equaled -2.5% of GDP, over 7 percentage 
points below its peak rate in 2009.53   The BCA’s vision to reduce the cumulative federal 
deficit by 1.2 trillion through bipartisan compromise, enforceable discretionary spending 
caps, and cuts to mandatory outlays were significant achievements that built on the 
budget reform mechanisms and successes of the BEA.  However, in the intervening years 
up until today, Congress has obstructed the potentiality of the CBA by repeatedly acting 
to raise the caps on discretionary spending, thus avoiding a sequester as well as 
opportunity to enforce fiscal discipline.   
 The first legislation to raise the controlled discretionary caps came in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013.  The BBA of 2013, also referred to as the Murray-
Ryan agreement, provided roughly $63 billion in enforcement relief to be split between 
FY2014 and FY2015.54  The defense and non-defense discretionary caps as set forth by 
the BCA were each increased by $22 billion in FY2014, and by $9 billion in FY2015.55  
To offset the raises in expected appropriation levels,56 Congress extended the mandatory 
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spending aspects of the sequester57 for two additional years, covering FY2022 and 
FY2023.  They also implemented a number of other miscellaneous budget cuts and 
provisions, which in tandem with the extension of the sequester on mandatory spending, 
led the CBO to score as Murray-Ryan agreement as producing a deficit reduction of $85 
billion through FY2023.58  However, many of the outlined budget reductions 
incorporated to offset the cap increases were regarded as unpopular or gimmicky in 
practice.  For example, $6 billion in savings were expected to be harvested from reducing 
cost-of-living increases for retired military personnel between the ages 40 and 62.  After 
mounting opposition from defense interest groups, the pension reform provisions were 
reversed and barred from applying to any current or former military members.   The 
provisions offsetting the caps raises also depended on the extension of U.S. Customs user 
fees ($7 billion) and sales of Strategic Petroleum Reserves at inflated estimates ($3 
billion), two oft-used budget gimmicks that mask true costs.59  
 The second time Congress moved to increase the original discretionary budget 
caps of the CBA (See Figure 3) emerged as a result of extended negotiations between 
outgoing Speaker John Boehner and President Obama.  In total, the 2015 BBA increased 
both the defense and non-defense spending limits by $25 billion in FY2016 and by $15 
billion in FY2017.60   
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Figure 3.  CBA Discretionary Budget Limits as Amended 
Source: Congressional Research Service, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked 
Questions 
 
 Like the previous BBA, it also extended the mandatory spending sequester, this 
time through FY2025.  To maintain the technical characterization that bill was deficit 
neutral, the 2015 BBA included offsetting language and provisions that cut prospective 
spending within the 10-year budget window.  However, like its predecessor, the 
provisions were dubious policy,61 and nearly half of the spending restrictions were not set 
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to be realized until 2025, the last year affected by the bill.62  The resulting increase in 
interest costs on the debt was not addressed in either 2013 or 2015 BBA.  By relying on 
budget gimmicks and potential savings that cannot be realized for many years, Congress 
limited their opportunity to reduce the deficit as envisioned in the CBA.     
 The 2018 BBA, the first budget legislation signed by President Trump, brought 
forth the largest increases to the discretionary spending caps.  FY2018 received a $80 
billion increase in defense spending, with the non-defense spending limit being increased 
by $63 billion.  In FY2019, the defense and non-defense caps were boosted by $85 
billion and $68 billion respectively.  Again, to provide offsetting savings, the 2018 BBA 
stretched the mandatory spending sequester, mostly affecting Medicare, by two more 
years through FY2027.63  In total, the CBO estimated that the 2018 BBA, having raised 
the two-year budget caps by almost $300 billion, would result in increased deficits of 
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 To address the ballooning deficits plaguing our fiscal outlook, I recommend the 
Speaker 1) Direct the Chairman of the House Committee on Rules to draw up a joint 
resolution re-establishing a Joint Select Committee on Budget Reform and 2) Advise the 
Joint Committee to markup statuary language for passage as public law amending the 
1974 CBA so as to establish a biennial system of budgeting whereas each Congressional 
cycle consists of alternating years of appropriation and authorization.  Each appropriation 
measure would provide for 2-year funding of the programs under its purview and be 
enforced through point of order.  This reorganization of the CBA into a biennial structure 
would aim correct the consistent legislative abuses of the federal budget process and 
propel the country on a fiscal track that eliminates the federal deficit within twenty-five 
years.   
 At the Speaker’s behest, the Chairman of the House Committee on Rules,65 
should introduce as soon as feasibly possible a Joint Resolution that convenes a Joint 
Select Committee of the 116th Congress tasked with “addressing America’s alarming debt 
levels through revision of budgetary processes.”  The Resolution would call for the 
Committee to consist of twenty members. In addition to the chair and co-chair of both 
budget committees, the respective majority and minority in each chamber would be 
called to appoint four members no later than one month after enactment.   Two Senators 
from opposite parties, nominated at leadership discretion, would act as co-chairs, and the 
Committee would be authorized for reimbursement of up to $500,000 from the legislative 
                                                 





appropriation during the current fiscal year.66   These costs could be allocated to holding 
hearings that engage experts, thinktanks, interest groups, other lawmakers, and academics 
on the recent history of the federal debt and how appropriation reform could curb federal 
spending by focusing on oft-abused budgetary processes.  The Committee would be 
required, per the Joint Resolution, to convene within one month of appointment and 
deliver a report of their recommendations along with possible statutory language to the 
President, Speaker, and Congressional leadership within one year’s time.   
 In conjunction with the Joint Select Committee, the Speaker should recommend 
and mark-up for passage into public law a bill that would amend the 1974 Congressional 
Budget Act.  This bill, entitled the “Budget Process and Appropriation Modernization,” 
(BPAM) would primarily modify the appropriations process in such a fashion that each 
meeting of the legislative branch67 would constitute a biennium, requiring appropriation 
measures and 302(b) allocations to cover 2-year fiscal periods.  In effect, each 
Congressional year would alternate between appropriation and authorization.  The first 
session, every odd-numbered year, would be committed to budget action, while the 
second would concern oversight, authorizing language, and additional appropriations to 
address supplemental needs or emergency requirements.  Under this proposed biennial 
structure, legislators would not need to act on appropriations during the second year of 
each Congress, thus freeing up precious legislative time to both develop more effective 
agency evaluation and to engage the necessary actors on producing authorizing language 
that is both programmatic advantageous and fiscally responsible.   
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 Within this new biennium, both the President’s budget request and the budget 
resolution would remain as components of budgetary law.  The President’s budget, as 
formulated through OMB, would outline funding requests for all federal 
departments/agencies, indicate expected revenue, and incorporate supplementary 
information on initiatives that highlight the administration’s priorities.   However, instead 
of transmitting the budget request annually, it would only be due in the first year of the 
biennium.  For example, the budget request for fiscal years 2021 and 2021 would be 
transmitted to Congress on the first Monday of February in calendar year 2020.   
Likewise, the budget resolution, containing spending and revenue targets for the relative 
two years in question,68 would maintain its non-statutory quality.  However, the BPAM 
should specify that to account for the additional fiscal year material, the budget resolution 
deadline should be extended to May 1st, an amendment to the CBA target of April 15th.  
Unlike Congress’ current handling of the budget resolution, miscellaneous appropriations 
such as OCO money and emergency spending should be incorporated in base line figures, 
a move that would signal intent to cover the most amount of discretionary spending under 
one procedural umbrella.  As is existing practice, appropriations which exceed levels in 
the budget resolution would be subject to point of order objections.   
 The second session of Congress, freed from the necessity of budget actions, 
would utilize the additional time to deliberate over authorizing language and hold 
hearings that exercise the oversight functions of congressional responsibilities.  With 
valuable time on the legislative calendar now available, authorizing committees could 
focus their staff hours and resources on implementing reviews from inspector generals 
                                                 





and closely considering the merits of each programmatic portfolio under their purview.  
The BPAM should specify that multiyear authorizations should be enacted and signed 
into law by October 1st of the second session of each Congress.   
Biennial budgeting, particularly in the form multiyear authorizations and two-year 
appropriations has been an oft-discussed topic amongst policy analysts, having received 
support and mark-up in all the presidential administrations from Reagan to W. Bush’s.  
However, no proposal has ever passed both houses of Congress and been brought to the 
President for consideration.69  The BPAM, holding the full force of public law, would 
actualize a biennial system and restructure the budget process according to multi-year 
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 The BPAM’s restructuring of the federal budget process into bienniums aims to 
develop new norms to jettison the dysfunction of obscured costs, regular stop-gap 
measures, and budgetary gimmicks, ultimately redirecting American towards a fiscally-
sustainable outlook with limited debt.  In this section, it’s my intention to evaluate: 1) the 
advantages and disadvantages of biennial budgeting in terms of effectual policy and 2) 
the prospects of biennial budgeting in light of state and municipal action. 
 The BPAM’s introduction of biennial budgeting and multiyear authorizations 
present various pros and cons if enacted.   Taken together, the realignment of the budget 
cycle and the requirement that all twelve appropriation subcommittees pass two-year 
appropriations work towards the same end, to provide Congress and the President with 
additional time to enact appropriations before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 
thereby ostensibly reducing the need for continuing resolutions and stop-gap measures.  
In 2018, the GAO found through a review of the previous twenty fiscal years that 
repeated continuing resolutions and lapses in appropriations (shutdowns) leads to reduced 
governmental services and increased costs.70  This loss of productivity manifests itself 
via tardy payments of contracts/grants, delayed hiring, and additional administrative 
work.  In theory, starting the budget process earlier and with greater certainty for out-
years would allow for additional time to consider budgetary measures, thus avoiding the 
type of procurement and management inefficiencies as found by the GAO.  If this were 
successful in eliminating gap-measures or lapses in funding, private and public sectors 
actors would benefit.  Contractors would possess greater work and payment security, and 
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federal employees would spend less time completing the organizational chores necessary 
to obligate funds.  Proponents of biennial budget cycles generally contend that it 1) 
reduces congressional workload by expelling part of the demands associated with annual 
consideration of budget questions 2) affords Congress more time to carry out its oversight 
responsibilities and promote long-term review of programmatic functions 3) provides 
federal, state, and local government agencies more certainty in terms of funding levels 
and long-term planning.   By effectively setting spending levels for two years at the first 
session of a new Congress, the cycle might reduce demands on Representatives’ time, 
and allow for more focus on authorizations and program analysis.    
 A split model of congressional sessions of appropriation and authorization offers 
the possibility of numerous advantages over our current annualized system.  Primarily, 
reducing the legislative time that is spent on budgeting would open avenues for more 
effective oversight as well as assist in meeting the conditions of the Government 
Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA).   According to the 
Congressional periodical Roll Call, roughly 70% of all roll call votes in the Senate 
throughout the 2000s concerned budgetary matters.71  Procedural votes, deeming 
resolutions, and budget debates consumes much of the legislative schedule, particularly 
in the Senate, in effect driving the priorities and agenda of elected leaders.   With 
discretionary accounts constituting a mere 30% of all federal spending as compared to 
mandatory entitlement programs, it is illogical and incongruent to commit so much 
Congressional time to an appropriation process that will increasingly represent a smaller 
portion of outlays.  Biennial budgeting would also provide a reprieve from the repetitive 
                                                 





administrative tasks that agency level budget offices undertake in effort to comply with 
the GPRAMA and in response to OMB circular bulletins.  Testifying to the House Rules 
Committee on the possibility of biennial appropriations, Susan Irving, the Director for 
Federal Budget Analysis at the GAO, stated succinctly: 
For agency budget officials… the arguments for biennial budgeting may seem 
quite strong.  Currently, agency budget officers spend several months every year 
preparing a ‘from the ground up’ budget with voluminous written justifications.  
Much of this work is repetitious.  In contract, requests for supplemental 
appropriations are handled on an exception basis.  If, under a biennial 
appropriations process, the “off-year” updates, amendments, or adjustments were 
treated like supplemental appropriations, the savings in agency time could be 
significant.72 
 
 In summation, agency level budget officials would also benefit from a reduction 
in administrative tasks and reporting requirements that a shift to biennial budgeting 
would bring.  Agency time and resources could be allocated to expanding more thorough 
evaluations of programs and developing responses to oversight inquiries.  The 
expression, “time is money,” is an oft-used cliché, but is regarded as a valid criterion of 
productivity in both the private and public sectors.  If the perception of many budget 
experts, including from such career officials as Leon Panetta, 73 is valid, then the 
additional hours, capital, and assets that are required for proper budget analysis on a 
yearly basis could be sparred and redirected towards driving efficiency and enhancing 
outputs.74 
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 In terms of oversight and authorizations, the second year of a biennium would 
afford authorizing committees proper space to carry out their constitutional duties of 
programmatic and spending evaluation, with an eye towards eliminating waste and 
ensuring federal dollars are directed towards their most effective and efficient use.  This 
oversight is particularly important as appropriated spending is further reduced, via 
increased interest and mandatory spending, as a share of total outlays.  Routinely, 
authorizing committees commit more resources and time in their agendas towards 
authorizing new programs throughout all federal departments instead of scrubbing and 
investigating the ones that currently exist.  As I captured in my historical analysis, 
mandatory spending and health care costs are allowed to organically rise year to year, and 
legislative action to combat these escalations have only been taken on the brink of 
insolvency and reduced payments.  Additionally, according to the Department of 
Commerce, appropriated funding for programs with expired authorizations has averaged 
over $150 billion.75  This type of bifurcation between appropriation and authorizing 
committees could be rectified in a split year biennium, as the additional time would allow 
for legislative clarification over whether such appropriations are still necessary going 
forward.  
 Another advantage of a biennial cycle is that it confers greater emphasis on long-
term planning, long-term strategic objectives, and a wider perspective of how today’s 
commitments affect future obligations.  As I expressed earlier, primarily due to the 
exponential growth of mandatory costs, interest payments on the debt are expected to 
overtake costs for the Department of Defense by 2023.  Despite this outlook, debt levels 
                                                 





and therefore interest payments continue to rise.  Discretionally, Congress’ usage of 
emergency funding under the BEA and appropriations to OCO funds since 2011 are also 
illustrations of how short-term planning and a lack of foresight impact budgetary 
consequences.  Since these types of allocations are often made in haste and outside the 
traditional appropriation subcommittees, their burden on out-year costs are obscured.  
This type of crisis management organically produces ad hoc budgeting decisions that are 
not grounded in long-term planning and objectives.  Two-year bienniums would require 
that lawmakers consider needs that are beyond an annual basis, choosing to supply for 
them in appropriations or weigh how not funding them over the course of multiple years 
will affect programmatic outcomes.  No reputable business would function without a 
long-term vision or a firm grasp on how their financial commitments affect a longer fiscal 
outlook, yet the federal budget process appears blind to such practices through its annual 
treatment of appropriations.   On an agency level, the assurance of funding for two fiscal 
years would provide certainty in competing contracts, hiring staff, and developing 
strategic objectives that align with GPRAMA requirements.  Executive agencies are 
responsible for submitting their budget submissions for the next fiscal year to OMB 
during the Fall, but without full-year enacted appropriations in current year, it’s 
tremendously difficult to estimate what their spending levels should be the next.  
Multiyear authorizations and appropriations would also limit opportunities for funding 
lapses, the consequences of which were manifested in the most recent government 
shutdown, which delayed “$18 billion in federal discretionary spending for compensation 
and purchases of goods and suspended federal services.”76  The certainty of funding 
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would also provide relief to state governments, who increasingly rely on funding from 
federal grants and welfare programs.  For example, in 2015, federal aid comprised 65% 
of total state spending towards welfare programs such as Medicaid, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), child welfare, and assistance for low-income 
individuals.   For education-related programs such as Head State and language assistance 
initiatives, federal aid comprised of 13% of total education spending across the fifty 
states.77  
 Given that biennial budgeting has been proposed repeatedly as an avenue for 
reform since the 1970s without enactment, it’s no surprise that there exist numerous and 
noteworthy policy shortcomings concerning its adoption.  First, the benefits of long-term 
budget planning could only be realized with accurate budget projections.  Estimating 
these figures with certainty is a dubious proposition, given that they are subject to policy 
changes, formula errors, and swings in economic output.  In January of 2009, the total 
deficit for FY19 was projected to be $235 billion; however, the CBO currently estimates 
that the deficit for the fiscal year will reach $897 billion.  From 1980 through 1998, the 
predicted deficit to the actual deficit per fiscal year varied on average by $55 billion.78  
Under the current timeline for budget formulation and justification, agencies would be 
tasked with crafting their budget submission for the second year in a biennium at least 
twenty-eight months before the start of year and forty months before it concludes.  OMB, 
charged with evaluating funding requests for the President’s Budget and providing their 
findings to agencies via passback in November, would need to author key decisions 
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twenty-two months before the beginning of the biennium’s authorization year.  Given this 
considerable lead time, there would inevitably be outdated analysis, changes in economic 
conditions, and shifts in programmatic priorities.  Testifying before the House Budget 
Committee in 2011, CBO analyst Philip Joyce expressed tactfully: 
The federal government has a rather checkered history of budget forecasting. To 
produce a budget every two years would increase the probability that it would be 
based on erroneous information and would therefore need to be redone. The 
biennial process may degenerate into an annual process, given the uncertainties 
associated with budgeting for a $4 trillion enterprise.79 
 
 Mr. Joyce’s concerns are manifested in the data on budget projections.  In the 10-
years prior to the beginning of the banking collapse in 2006, that is, when economic 
conditions shifted dramatically, CBO prediction errors as it pertains to outlays one-year 
into the future averaged 4.2%.  For predictions two-years into the future, the error more 










Figure 4.  Estimation Errors as Percentage of Outlays 
Source: Stuart Young et Drew McLelland, Implementing Biennial Budgeting  
for the U.S. Congress 
                                                 






 The heightened unreliability of budget data two-years into the future highlights 
another issue with a biennial model.  To account for the forecasting variances and prevent 
budgets and authorizations from relying on erroneous assumptions, critics contend that a 
biennial system would require a considerable need for supplemental or off-year funding 
legislation.  As I underlined with the history of emergency spending and OCO funds, 
these supplemental appropriations are often executed haphazardly and without concern 
for long-term costs or rigorous scrutiny from analysts.  Pressure to enact supplemental 
appropriations would be significant, and in terms of policy, could culminate in just as 
much budget action as under the current annual process, albeit under an ad hoc basis that 
is neglectful of program priorities and manipulative of spending enforcement 
mechanisms.  Frequent revision due to inaccurate economic and budget estimates would 
thus largely negate the benefits afforded under a biennial system, risking further abuse of 
processes that drive up costs and diminishes proper justification.    
 In terms of lessons from case studies, the current state of affairs under the Budget 
Control Act and the history of biennial budgeting on a state level exhibit causes for 
concern.  Since 2011, levels for discretionary appropriations have been supplied for via 
the Budget Control Act and its legislative successor the Bipartisan Budget Act.  To avoid 
the harsh across-the-board reductions of sequestration, Congress agreed beginning in 
2014, via the instances of the BBA, to a series of two-year budget deals that raise the 
discretionary caps.  These deals have provided ceilings to appropriated funds across all 
discretionary accounts for two-years, essentially requiring that appropriation 
subcommittees carry out their work within a specific fiscal framework in year two of the 





has increased from $438 billion in 2014 to $779 billion in 2018.80  Notwithstanding the 
biennial agreements, Congress still circumvented the cap processes designed to lower 
yearly deficits, and indeed has resorted to continuing resolutions, lapses in funding, and 
large omnibus legislation that lacks long-term perspective and necessitates higher 
administrative costs on an agency level.  In short, the recent history of the BCA and BBA 
demonstrate that two-year funding agreements are not a remedy to process failure and 
deficit reduction. 
 The experience of biennial budgeting on the state-level is an oft-cited authority on 
the capacity of biennial budgets to provoke change and lower deficits.   In the past 
seventy years, states have overwhelmingly dismissed biennial budget for annualized 
procedures.  In 1940, forty-four states practiced biennial budgeting.  Today, only nineteen 
enact their budgets under such system.  This shift to annual budgets has been attributed 
to, among other factors, growing populations, yearly convening of state legislatures, more 
complex programmatic elements, and a dependence of state budgets on federal funding.  
Of the ten most populous states in the union, eight of them adhere to an annual system, 
affirming in part the argument that larger states with bigger and more volatile revenue 
streams are more properly served appropriating funds year to year.  On the contrary, less 
populous states and those with legislatures that only meet every other year have tended to 
utilize a biennial model.  In response to a House Rules inquiry in 2000, the GAO 
collected and analyzed data in three states81: Arizona, Connecticut, and Ohio.  In 
developing their report to Congress, GAO auditors interviewed state officials, reviewed 
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project management data, and consulted OMB executive branch perspectives.  Arizona 
and Connecticut were specifically targeted because they had converted to a biennial 
model within ten years, while Ohio was selected for review based on its status as one of 
the top five states with the highest general expenditures.  Additionally, among these 
states, Ohio was the only one with a biennial budget process that acts in tandem with an 
annual legislature.  Their model is frequently cited as a success by advocates for biennial 
reform.   All three of the states’ application of biennial budget shared common goals with 
proposals on the federal level: to reduce the time and resources required for budget 
activity, to enhance legislative oversight capacity, and to promote longer-term focus and 
program evaluation as a means to driving down costs.  In Connecticut, biennial budgeting 
was enacted in FY1994 as part of a package of initiatives in response to a fiscal crisis that 
depleted the state’s reserve funding and produced a deficit of nearly $1 billion.82  
Connecticut converted all executive agencies to a biennial schedule simultaneously and 
required that their budgeting account for the second year of the biennium. The enacting 
legislation included such riders as a cap on bond indebtedness and mandated that 
revenues/expenditures be forecasted for the next five fiscal years.  By 2006, the state had 
seen a considerable improvement, as the Connecticut State Comptroller reported that the 
state had achieved a surplus of $940.5 million.83  However, in analyzing their improved 
fiscal picture, the GAO noted that, “establishing spending caps, which were also part of 
the fiscal reform package, proved to be more important than biennial budgeting in 
affecting the state’s fiscal management.”84  These spending caps were instituted along 
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with the imposition of a new person income tax, and as GAO affirmed, these changes to 
raise additional revenue and enforce spending limits were more efficacious than any other 
factors in eliminating debt.   In Arizona, the state’s legislature in 1996 decided to move 
twenty-six smaller agencies to a biennial cycle first, in attempt to test the effects of new 
processes on a smaller scale.  Pleased with the outcomes, Arizona transitioned their 
remaining executive agencies to a biennial model in 2000.  Arizona officials, in 
explaining their budget activity, noted that they adopted biennial budgeting primarily as a 
means to free up legislative time for more robust oversight.  By 2006, Arizona coffers 
held a $1.5 billion surplus.85  However, like with Connecticut, the GAO contended that 
intervening factors were at play.  First, Arizona’s Constitution contains a balanced budget 
requirement that instructs the governor to reprogram or impound funds to prevent a 
projected shortfall.  Second, Arizona law instructs the Comptroller to maintain a Budget 
Stabilization Fund to capture revenues during periods of economic growth which can be 
utilized in times of recession.  These statutory mechanisms most likely had more to do 
with achieving surpluses than their window of budgeting.  In summarizing their analysis, 
the GAO concluded that, “The experiences of the case study states demonstrate how 
difficult it is to use a biennial budget process to increase legislative oversight…whether a 
biennial cycle offers the benefits sought in will depend on the ability of the Congress and 
the President to reach agreement on how to design and enforce the off-year process and 
how to respond to unanticipated needs.”86   
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 The populace’s opinion and tolerance of growing deficits are chiefly important to 
the political context of enacting a biennial budget process.  According to a January 2019 
Pew Research survey, “the nation’s growing budget deficit has prompted little alarm 
among the U.S. public.”87  Since the impasse of the fiscal cliff and the triggering of BCA 
sequestration in 2013, the public concern for the national debt as a fundamental priority 
as acutely declined.  In 2009 when deficits reached its peak of $1.4 trillion, 57% of 
Americans responded that the budget deficit should be a top priority for the President and 
Congressional leadership.  By 2013, when the simultaneous occurrences of the fiscal 
cliff, pending sequestration, debt ceiling crisis, and a government shutdown propelled the 
country’s fiscal condition into national debate, the percentage of Americans who counted 
the deficit as a top priority reached 73%.  In 2019, only five years later, that same 
percentage of Americans had dwindled to 48%.88  As evidenced by Pew’s polling, public 
concern about debt levels has largely been inversely proportional to rising deficits, with 
OMB projecting a nearly $1 trillion deficit in FY2019, the largest in seven years and 
nearly double the shortfall in FY2015,89 when public sentiment of budget deficits as a top 
priority for elected leaders was 12% higher than today.  Across the 18-year period from 
2002 to 2019, an average of 51% of all Americans supported reducing debt as a primary 
concern.  Specific to liberal-minded voters, Pew found that amongst Democrats and 
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democratic-learning independents, only 44% reported that reducing deficits should be a 










Figure 5.  Feelings about the Deficit by Party 
Source: J. Baxter Oliphant, Pew Research, Fewer Americans View Deficit Reduction as 
Top Priority 
 
 As Pew summarized succinctly, “Annual budget deficits surpassed $1 trillion 
from 2009 through 2012, and the share of Americans viewing deficit reduction as a top 
policy priority surged during this period. As annual deficits declined, so did concern 
about the deficit. But the rise in deficits more recently has not been accompanied by an 
increase in public concern.”90  Overall, these trends in public sentiment toward deficits 
illustrate that no clear majority exists, especially among liberal constituents, for 
promoting debt reduction as a central policy issue.  Framing biennial budgeting as a 
means to such an end would thus be politically incongruent with the increasing number of 
citizens who are more tolerable of annual deficits.   
                                                 





 Furthermore, Americans have little appetite for any reductions in federal 
spending.  According to a March 2019 Pew survey91 that sought to gauge public 
temperature on thirteen programmatic areas,92 most respondents “either wanted to 
increase spending or maintain it at current levels….no more than a quarter [of those who 
replied] favored reducing spending in any specific area.”93  Correspondingly, since 2013, 
the same year Pew singled out as marking a shift in public opinion of annual deficits, 
there has been a significant uptick in the number of Americans who favor increased 
spending across such program areas as anti-terrorism, military defense, and veterans 
benefits.  Only one of the thirteen categories, “assistance to needy in the world,” had 
more than a quarter (28%) of respondents saying spending should be decreased.  This 
context further highlights that biennial budgeting as means to decrease outlays would be 
politically out of favor with a majority of Americans.   
 In terms of gauging how Congress would approach the proposed policy, it’s again 
relevant to note that biennial budgeting has been proffered as a possible reform and 
attracted significant legislative interest since the infancy of the CBA as enacted law.  
Leon Panetta, at the time a representative from California, introduced the first bill 
proposing a two-year cycle of authorization and appropriation with then Rep. Chuck 
Grassley as a co-sponsor in 1977.   Since then, several federal committees and 
commissions consisting of public and private actors have recommended some 
arrangement of biennial budgeting.  In total, legislation has been introduced in fourteen 
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of the past eighteen Congressional sessions.94  The majority of this legislation would 
have established bienniums with split authorization and appropriations years, was 
referred to one of the Rules or Budget Committees, and then discussed via public 
hearings.  Such hearings often incorporated testimony from budget analysts, academics, 
former elected officials, and policy thinktanks such as Convergence, the Bipartisan 
Policy Center, the American Action Forum.95   Proponents and co-sponsors of such 
legislation have largely been representative of both major political parties.  For example, 
current White House Chief of Staff and previous House representative from South 
Carolina, Mick Mulvaney, was one of the primary sponsors on the “Biennial Budgeting 
and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2015,” a bill which garnered 182 Republicans and 55 
Democrats as co-sponsors.96  Ultimately, like the rest of the legislative attempts to 
engender a biennial system, the bill was introduced and dismissed without a vote before 
both houses of Congress. 
 In terms of how biennial budgeting has been perceived politically by recent 
executives, the Reagan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush administrations all endorsed 
biennial processes for appropriations.  In 1993, Vice President Al Gore’s commission on 
the National Performance Review noted in its recommendations that “considerable time 
could be saved and used more effectively…. if budgets and appropriations were moved to 
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a biennial cycle.”97  While President Obama did not explicitly express his approval like 
his predecessors, Jack Lew, serving as Director of OMB, stated to the Senate in 2010 that 
“the annual budget process gives precious little time to focus on program 
implementation, both in the executive branch and the legislative branch.”98  So far 
through his term in office, neither President Trump nor any senior staff members have 
indicated whether they would support biennial reforms.   
 Critics of biennial budgeting have been equally representative of a diverse 
coalition of congressional actors, interest groups, and figures from both major political 
parties.  The Heritage Foundation, one of the most prominent conservative thinktanks and 
research institutions in the country, has repeatedly decried biennial budgeting through 
numerous reports and articles as “no antidote to budget process failure.”99  One 
significant political factor relative to the legislature, and perhaps a justification for why 
reform does not carve stakeholders across party lines, is that by approving a biennial 
budget, Congress would essentially be sacrificing flexibility in how it exercises its power 
of the purse.  Every first year of a biennium, that is, the year for appropriations, would be 
subject to authorizations and therefore decisions reached a year prior in the previous 
Congress.  Additionally, as the GAO report on states’ experiences indicated, biennial 
budgeting inherently requires mechanisms to govern and counteract pressures to 
frequently revise budgets during off-years.  Without such a system, budgeting activity 
would become nearly as commonplace as under the current annual structure, negating the 
                                                 
97 Office of Vice President Al Gore, Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less: Mission-
Driven, Results-Oriented Budgeting (Washington, DC: General Publishing Office, 1994). 
98 Tollestrup, "Biennial Budgeting: Options, Issues, and Previous Congressional Action," , 1-19 






possibility of more robust oversight and programmatic evaluation.  The refined practices 
necessary to manage off-year budgeting would act as an essential check on Congress’ 
flexibility to appropriate funds when and how it wishes.  As an institution, the political 
minority has no more enthusiasm for diminished Congressional authority than the 
political majority, resulting in advocates and opponents that do not adhere to traditional 
political ideologies.  Furthermore, in terms of political gamesmanship, gimmicks, and 
lapses in funding, biennial budgeting may only exacerbate the conflicts that plaque our 
current system.  Legislators, aware that the fruits of their negotiations would be longer 
lasting, may be more inclined to intensify their disagreements and eleventh-hour 
brinksmanship, resulting in an even greater number of continuing resolutions and 
shutdowns.  Rep. David Obey, former democratic Chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee, remarked that two-year budgets would, “mean that people will be less 
willing, not more willing to compromise and in the end that means that the debate on the 
budget is likely to spill over into the second year and all we’ve done is to lengthen rather 
than shorten our budget fights.”100  Any policy benefits bienniums would engender risk 
being nullified in political conflict.  As leadership in Congress, navigating around such 
political inaction through compromise and diplomacy will be imperative to the success of 





                                                 








 The alarming trajectory of federal deficits is a legitimate burden that will result in 
tangible, negative consequences for lawmakers and taxpayers alike.  As interest rates 
continue to rise, federal budgeting will necessitate larger interest payments, thereby 
reducing national savings and capital at a faster rate.  According to the Congressional 
Budget Office, “interest payments will overtake Medicaid in 2020 and the Department of 
Defense budget in 2023.”101  Additionally, mandatory spending costs for social security 
and related health-care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid are only expected to 
grow, accounting for nearly 70% of total federal spending and 12.8% GDP by 2029.102  
The risks and sources of ballooning deficit also manifest themselves structurally through 
specific federal budgetary processes.  In particular, Congress’ treatment of pay-as-you-go 
rules, the budget reconciliation guidelines, emergency spending authorizations, and the 
disregard for discretionary spending caps have all suffered abuse at the hands of its 
legislative creators, exacerbating the continued trek toward fiscal insolvency, prompting 
larger interest payments, and encouraging the dissolution of rules designed to keep 
outlays consistent with revenue.   To reform the budget process which has existed in its 
current state since the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, a system of 
biennial budgeting with split periods of multi-year appropriations and authorizations has 
been proffered as a means to rectify abused practices and thereby reduce deficits.   
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Proponents of such a model contend that it would 1) lesson Congressional workload by 
expelling some of demands associated with annual consideration of budget questions 2) 
afford Congress more time to carry out its oversight responsibilities and promote long-
term review of programmatic functions 3) provide federal, state, and local government 
agencies more certainty in terms of funding levels and long-term planning.  With roughly 
70% of all roll call votes in the Senate devoted to budgetary matters,103 a biennial model 
that effectively sets levels for two years at the first session of a new Congress offers the 
opportunity to reduce the legislative time that is spent on budgeting, thereby opening 
avenues for more effective oversight that meets the long-term and outcome-driven focus 
of the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA).    
   Despite the stated potential of biennial budgeting to mend current processes and 
spur America toward a future of fiscal surpluses, I must ultimately recommend against 
enacting a biennium model into public law on several policy and political grounds.  First, 
the considerable lead-time required from agencies and OMB to produce two-year budget 
forecasts would inevitably result in outdated analysis, changes in economic conditions, 
and shifting of programmatic priorities.  Pressure to enact supplemental appropriations as 
a tool would be significant, and in terms of policy, could culminate in just as much 
budget action as under the current annual process, albeit under an ad hoc basis that is 
neglectful of program priorities and manipulative of spending enforcement mechanisms.  
Frequent revision due to inaccurate economic and budget estimates would thus largely 
negate the benefits afforded under a biennial system, risking further abuse of processes 
that drive up costs and diminish proper accountability.   Furthermore, states have 
                                                 






overwhelmingly shifted away from biennial schedules in the past fifty years.   In their 
analysis of three states that had recently established bienniums, the GAO noted that, 
“establishing spending caps, which were also part of the fiscal reform package, proved to 
be more important than biennial budgeting in affecting the state’s fiscal management.”104  
In other words, any fruit bore from passing biennial reforms would be largely dependent 
on the ability of the executive and legislative to resolve how to enforce processes and 
how to respond to unforeseen needs.  If biennial governing was successful in thinning 
deficits, it would most likely be the result of other factors such as spending caps or 
mandatory spending adjustments, especially in light of the fact that mandatory spending 
such as Social Security and Medicare represents over 60% of outlays each year.  
Politically, public opinion polling reveals that Americans are generally more tolerant of 
rising debt, and less than a quarter of the populace wants to see spending cuts to any 
major programmatic area.  Biennial budgeting also risks restricting Congress’ authority 
and flexibility in how and when it chooses to appropriate funds, an outcome which is 
dubious to the political majority and minority alike.  Additionally, instead of limiting 
gamesmanship and the potential for frequent shutdowns, two-year appropriations will 
only intensify disagreements, as legislators come to terms with the lengthier 
consequences of their negotiations.  For these reasons, I therefore recommend against 
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